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ABSTRACT
Small and medium size businesses often take advantage of the latest advancements in technology.
Doing so, however, now seems to carry the risk of patent infringement. In 2012, so called patent trolls,
also known as Non Practicing Entities, began sending letters to small and medium sized businesses
demanding money in exchange for a license to use allegedly patented technology. Many saw the
demands as an abuse of the patent system. In response, states have passed or are considering statutes
that outlaw patent holders from delivering a bad faith notice of infringement. The State of Vermont
was the first to address this issue. Vermont amended its consumer protection laws to outlaw “Bad
faith assertions of patent infringement.” But how far can Vermont and other states go before being
preempted by the federal government? This comment asks that very question. After analyzing the
original intent of Congress, a theory of field preemption and the Constitutional right to petition the
government, this comment concludes with the opinion that state-based laws meant to discourage Non
Practicing Entities from sending bad faith cease and desist letters are preempted by the federal patent
regime. Finally, this comment proposes that the best way to discourage Non Practicing Entities from
harassing companies with frivolous law suits is to allow victorious defendants in patent infringement
suits to collect damages from the losing plaintiffs.
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PATENTLY PREEMPTED
NICK VOGEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
How minimal an understanding of patent law may a small business owner possess
before opening a business without fear of patent infringement lawsuits? These days,
it seems that small companies and main street businesses need a more sophisticated
handle on patent law than previously thought.1
In September of 2012, businesses in the State of Vermont began to receive letters 2
warning that their use of scan-to-e-mail technology violated several patents. 3 One such
business was a non-profit called Lincoln Inc.4 The letter claimed that a company called
* © Nick Vogel 2015. J.D., January 2016, The John Marshall Law School; Editor-in-Chief of the
Decisive Utterance student newspaper from 2012 until 2015; feature writer and investigative
journalist from 2006 until 2011. I want to thank my wife Sonja for her patience and encouragement.
I also thank my sons Bert and Dash for letting me disappear so often to study. Finally, thanks to the
editors and staff of RIPL for their guidance.
1 Betsy Bishop Comments on Vermont's First-in-Nation Patent Trolling Prevention Law,
VERMONT
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE
(July
1,
2013),
(http://www.vtchamber.com/wcnews/NewsArticleDisplay.aspx?articleid=421) (warning that lawsuits
from so-called patent trolls will be detrimental to Vermont businesses) (hereinafter “Bishop”).
2 Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (June. 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protectamerican-innovation) Hereinafter “Sperling”) (stating that “in the last two years, the number of
lawsuits brought by patent trolls has nearly tripled, and account for 62% of all patent lawsuits in
America.”). Sperling writes that while the sheer volume of predatory and frivolous patent troll
lawsuits is alarming in and of itself, the economic cost resulting from these suits is even more
alarming, costing the victims of patent trolls $29 billion in 2011, in addition to “tens of billions dollars
more in lost shareholder value.” Id. This economic toll demonstrates that the negative impact on
society goes beyond just victimizing those with legitimate patent claims and potentially stifling
innovation in business, but also stifling commerce through its deterrent effect on potential investors
in new ideas. Id. The White House noted that abusive patent litigation makes it more difficult for
those pursuing legitimate intellectual property claims and the problem expands across the spectrum,
affecting Fortune 500 companies to small businesses and regular consumers. Id.
3 Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—For Using Scanners, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013, 8:30
AM),
(http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners/)
(pointing out that increasingly, small companies are being targeted with threats of patent
infringement lawsuits and hundreds or maybe thousands of businesses were targeted with letters
threatening lawsuits in the fall of 2012).
4 Complaint at 8, State of Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., 2014 WL 1494009 (D. Vt. Apr. 15,
2014)(No. 2:13-CV-170) (hereinafter “The complaint”) (arguing that MPHJ’s unpreparedness to follow
through with a lawsuit against the Vermont businesses that received letters from MPHJ was an
unfair method of competition in commerce). If true, such an allegation would have been covered
specifically under the state’s 9 § 4197, which defines an illegal, bad faith assertion of patent
infringement.

Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to conduct an analysis
comparing the claims in the patent to the target's products, services, and
technology, or such an analysis was done but does not identify specific areas in
which the products, services, and technology are covered by the claims in the
patent.
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MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC. (“MPHJ”) owned a patent on scanning
documents and then e-mailing them.5 Over the next several months hundreds of
businesses in Vermont and other states began receiving similar letters.6 In these
letters, MPHJ demanded that each company pay $900 to $1,200 per employee in
exchange for a license to continue using the patented “technology” MPHJ owned. 7
Otherwise, MPHJ would file a lawsuit.8 While MPHJ does own the patent at issue, it
does not actually use the patent. Scholars and courts commonly refer to corporations
like MPHJ as Non Practicing Entities, or NPEs for short.9 These NPEs typically own
a patent merely to assert their rights against others in exchange for settlement sums
or license fees.10 In comparison, when an inventor receives a patent, the inventor gains
the right to “exclude others from making, using, and selling the claimed invention” in
order to bring the invention to market.11 Once the patent is granted, the patentee can
sell, divide or assign the rights that come with the patent. 12 An NPE often buys these

VT. STAT. ANN tit. 9, § 4197 (2013). The State of Vermont also lists the problems with the letters
MPHJ had sent to businesses in the state. Id. E.g., the state alleges that an attorney for MPHJ
Stated that litigation would have been brought against the “recipients when defendant was neither
prepared nor likely to bring litigation,” used legal counsel to imply that defendant had performed a
sufficient pre-suit investigation including an investigation into the target businesses and their
potentially “infringing activities that would be required to justify filing a lawsuit,” targeted small
businesses that were “unlikely to have the resources to fight patent litigation or even to pay patent
counsel,” sent letters that threatened “patent infringement litigation with no independent evidence
that the recipients were infringing it’s patents,” shifted the entire burden of the pre-suit investigation
“onto the small businesses that received the letters,” propounded burdensome information demands
“on any business that claimed not to have infringed the patents,” and used shell corporations in order
to hide “the true owners of the patents, avoid liability and encourage quick settlements.” Id.
5 The Complaint, supra note 4.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Morgan, Do Patent Trolls Have A Future?, FED LAW., (Oct. – Nov. 2013)
(explaining that a Patent Assertion Entity, or Patent Troll is “an entity, other than the original
inventor, who does not provide any product or service, but rather has acquired the patent for the
purpose of asserting it against others with the goal of extracting royalty payments that are less than
the costs of defense.”); see also Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) (describing an
NPE as “entities that use patents primarily to obtain license fees rather than to support the
development or transfer of technology, from other types of non-practicing entities.”); see also Miranda
Jones, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: How Ebay v.
Mercexchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035 (2007)
(describing companies that focus “solely on acquiring under-valued patents and realizing the value of
those patents through licensing and enforcement of the patent right” as NPEs.”)(hereinafter
“M.Jones”).
10 See supra text accompanying note 9.
11 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549, (1852) (establishing that the franchise granted by a
patent creates the right to “exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented,
without the permission of the patentee.”).
12 Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(explaining that a patent is a “bundle of rights which may be divided and assigned, or retained in
whole or part.”).
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patent rights from the original inventor, intending to practice the patent’s rights, not
the patent.13
When MPHJ tried to practice its patent rights in 2012, most companies would
have seen that the cost of fighting MPHJ in court outweighed the cost of a settlement. 14
Additionally, the cost of defending a patent suit would likely have a negative impact
on operating budgets.15 One source estimates that MPHJ sent about 16,465 letters to
small businesses in all 50 states.16 According to the Federal Trade Commission, 17
businesses agreed to purchase a license from MPHJ. 17 While issuance of the letters
may have garnered relatively few licenses, they did get the attention of many people.18
Most notably among those people was Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell. 19
He used his state’s consumer protection laws to file suit against MPHJ for unfair and
deceptive acts and practices in commerce.20 Just around the same time Sorrell filed
the lawsuit, Vermont passed a law that made it illegal to send in bad faith a cease and
desist letter for an alleged patent infringement.21 This new law (“Vermont’s bad faith
law”) was passed to protect Vermont businesses from having to cave to the demands of
NPEs.22
The letter received by Lincoln Inc. is an example of how an NPE operates. 23
Typically, the NPE will send a letter to a company, making a vague assertion with
13 M. Jones at 1040–41 (distinguishing between the act of practicing the patented invention and
“practicing the patent right.”).
14 Compare Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375,
377 (2014) (calling patent litigation “complex, expensive and unpredictable,” and noting that parties
in a patent dispute settle 65 to 68 percent of the time at the district court level and that “more settle
on appeal.”), with Keith Leffler, Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation
Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 36 (2004) (arguing that because “many
patents granted by the patent office are subsequently invalidated by the courts,” competitors feel
encouraged to intentionally infringe upon or challenge an existing patent).
15 Executive Office of the White House, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June 2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
(hereinafter
“Whitehouse report”) (reporting that businesses try to avoid the expense of defending a patent
infringement lawsuit because they fear having less money for “wages, job creation and innovation of
new products and services.”).
16 The Complaint, supra note 4 (stating that MPHJ sent letters to “hundreds or thousands of
businesses outside Vermont.”); Draft of Federal Trade Complaint against MPHJ Technology
Investments,
LLC
(Jan.
13,
2014),
available
at
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/14/draft_ftc_complt_to_mphj.pdf (alleging that MPHJ sent a total of
31,600 letters in three waves of letter writing campaigns to small businesses in all 50 states).
17 Id.
18 Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G, ARS TECHNICA
(May 22, 2013, 1:40 PM), (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/).
19 The Complaint, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20 Id.
21 Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts The Nation's First Anti-Patent Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22,
2013, 2:22 PM) (http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nationsfirst-anti-patent-trolling-law/)(hereinafter “Goldman”).
22 Id. (reporting that Vermont’s bad faith law gives potential defendants an opportunity to attack
NPEs first, “not just remain in limbo waiting to see if the asserter ever pursues its threats.”).
23 Caroline Coker Coursey, Battling the Patent Troll: Tips for Defending Patent Infringement
Claims by Non-Manufacturing Patentees, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 239 (2009) (explaining that NPEs
generally send companies a letter offering to license the patent upon which the business allegedly
infringed) (hereinafter “Coursey”).
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little specific evidence of infringement that the recipient of the letter has violated one
or more of the NPE’s patents. 24 NPEs make money when these demand letters
successfully intimidate small businesses into purchasing a license. 25 The business or
business owner on the receiving end of such a letter would argue that the letters
discourage innovation because they must consider the costs of expensive litigation
when patenting ideas.26
Vermont’s new bad faith law raises the question as to whether or not federal law
preempts any state action that seems to venture into patent law.27
Part II.A of this comment examines the existing federal laws that govern the
patent system. Part II.B examines Vermont’s bad faith law.
Part III.A of this comment analyzes federal preemption laws to reach the
conclusion that Vermont law conflicts with the objectives of Congress. Part III.B
analyzes field preemption to support the contention that federal law preempts
Vermont’s bad faith law. Part III.C analyzes constitutional issues that arise as a result
of Vermont’s bad faith law.
Part IV.A of this comment proposes that the best way to discourage NPEs from
harassing companies with frivolous law suits is to allow victorious defendants in
patent infringement suits to collect damages from the losing plaintiffs. Part IV.B
suggests that a “loser pays” rule will discourage the issuance of bad faith demand
letters. Finally, Part IV.C poses that fee shifting can solve potential constitutional
issues caused by state-laws that target bad faith demand letters.
This comment briefly concludes in Part V. by proposing that a “loser pays” solution
would discourage NPEs from taking advantage of the shortcomings of the federal
patent system.28

24 Coursey, supra note 23, at 241 (explaining that “patent troll will typically place [a] licensing
offer in a range that is cheaper than the costs of litigating the claim).
25 Id. at 241.
26 Michael Astorino, Obviously Troublesome: How High Should the Standard Be for Obtaining A
Patent, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 239, 247–48 (2007) (arguing that NPEs put the rights of
inventors in jeopardy by existing “primarily to make money from patents through litigation,” and that
patent litigation jeopardizes the rights of “serious inventors.” Astorino points out that actual inventors
have to “resort to defensive patenting” to avoid potential litigation for a patent infringement);
Whitehouse report at 2 (reporting that abusive patent litigation by NPEs or overly broad patent claims
“may dampen incentives for future innovation.”)
27 Goldman, supra note 21 (opining that “due to federal preemption doctrines, states cannot enact
their own patent laws, and that preemption principle may apply to this law.”) Goldman is a professor
at Santa Clara University School of Law where he teaches internet law, intellectual property law and
advertising law.
28 Timothy B. Lee, Patent Reform Bill Passes the House 325 to 91. Here’s What You Need To
Know,
Washington
Post,
(Dec.
5,
2013)
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/12/05/the-house-votes-on-patent-reform-today-heres-what-you-need-to-know/)
(though never signed into law, the act was an attempt to limit the impact of NPEs). In February, 2014,
Senator Clair McCaskill introduced a bill called the Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act
(hereinafter “TAPA”). The act is similar to both state laws and the failed Innovation Act, in that it
requires more detailed information be placed in a pre-litigation cease and desist letter. This was just
the latest attempt on behalf of the federal government to recognize a need for reform.
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II. BACKGROUND
Part A of this section discusses the history of the federal patent system and the
laws upon which federal courts claim original jurisdiction over patent disputes. Part
B of this section looks closer at Vermont’s bad faith law and what it entails.
A. Federal Control Over Patents
Congress’s power to regulate patents stems from the U.S. Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”29 With this power Congress passed the Federal
Patent Act, allowing individuals or businesses to obtain patents for their inventions. 30
The ensuing federal patent system was thus designed to encourage innovation and
industry competition.31 Congress next set up offices and guidelines for the issuance
and regulation of these patents. 32
The notion that Congress can preempt state laws has been with us so long that it
is now a “fundamental principal of the Constitution.” 33 The Supreme Court protects
this congressional power zealously. 34
In applying this well-established principle to patents, historically, the courts have
held that federal law preempts state laws that conflict with federal regulations. 35
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
31 Amelia Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 361
(2013); see also, John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2117
(2007) (explaining that patents have historically been considered beneficial to society).
32 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
33 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000).
34 Id.
In Crosby, the Supreme Court made sure to protect this preemption power even in
situations where a state tries to regulate an area of law that Congress has yet to regulate, holding
that “even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any
conflict with a federal statute,” and that the court will “find preemption where it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal law.” Id. at 372. Even in situations where the
state law in question merely seems to conflict with the “accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress,” the Supreme Court will find preemption. Id. at 372-73.
35 David E. Shipley, Refusing to Rock the Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine Applied
to Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385, 387 (1990). Shipley mentions that
on seven occasions cases have gone before the Supreme Court in which state laws were seen to
potentially conflict with Federal Patent law. Id. at 388. Those cases are Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (stating that “because of the federal patent laws a State may not,
when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award
damages for such copying.”); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)
(holding that state law conflicted with “the federal policy. . . of allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 142 (1989) (holding that a Florida law was preempted by “strong
federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.”); Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674–75 (1969) (mentioning in dicta that a state might have power to enforce a
contract for royalties on an unpatented invention while one party is waiting for a patent to be granted);
29
30
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Congress gives the federal courts power over patent disputes via the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all appeals concerning “[a]ny act
of Congress relating to patents.”36 Moreover, in 1964 the Supreme Court delivered an
unambiguous holding articulating that federal patent laws are “the supreme law of the
land.”37
When a patent holder files suit against a patent infringer, the patent holder must
follow federal laws regulating notification of potential patent infringement. 38 Written
notification of an alleged patent violation,
shall specify the patented process alleged to have been used and the reasons
for a good faith belief that such process was used. The patent holder shall
include in the notification such information as is reasonably necessary to
explain fairly the patent holder's belief, except that the patent holder is not
required to disclose any trade secret information. 39
Filing this notification is the first legal step in the settlement of a patent
infringement controversy.40 This notification is mandatory.41
Next, federal statute allows a patentee to file suit when someone “without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells [the patent holder’s] patented invention,”
in the United States.42 Patent lawsuits take place solely in federal courts in order to
homogenize the “realm of intellectual property.” 43 Society needs this homogenization
of patent laws because, as technology continues to advance, potential patent
infringements will continue to arise.44
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (upholding a California state law that made record piracy
a crime); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 559 (1974) (holding that federal patent laws
do not preempt a cause of action under Ohio's trade secret law) and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (holding that state enforcement of a contract for royalty payments does not
conflict with federal patent law).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
37 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (holding that federal patent laws
“are the supreme law of the land.” Id. In Sears, Roebuck the court had to determine whether state
laws outlawing “unfair competition,” were preempted by federal patent laws. Id. at 225. The court
said that such state laws would unfairly extend the number of years in which a patent holder
maintained control over a patent. Id. at 231.
38 35 U.S.C. § 287.
39 Id.
40 Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 246 (1894)(holding that “no damages shall be recovered by
the plaintiff, except on proof that the defendant was duly notified of the infringement, and continued,
after such notice, to make, use or vend the article so patented.” Id. This holding was ultimately
codified as 35 U.S.C. § 287.
41 Id. See, e.g., Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (where the court held
that notifying an alleged infringer “of the identity of the patent and the activity that is believed to be
an infringement, accompanied by a proposal to abate the infringement, whether by license or
otherwise” complies with the actual notice requirement of the marking statute.” Id.
42 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (stating that “A patentee shall have remedy by
civil action for infringement of his patent.” Id.
43 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 162 (stating that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction of actions
“arising under” the patent laws in the federal courts, thus allowing for the development of a uniform
body of law in resolving the constant tension between private right and public access.” Id.
44 See generally Charles Duhigg, The Patent, Used As a Sword, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (OCT. 7,
2013)
(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-
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The Supreme Court recognizes this ongoing conflict between patent holders and
the public’s voracious desire to use new technology.45 In a case called Bonito Boats v.
Thundercraft Boats, Inc. the Supreme Court held that states may not “second-guess”
patent laws that clearly balance the conflict between public needs and a patentee’s
rights.46 Moreover, federal statute gives Federal district courts original jurisdiction
“of any civil action arising under” patent laws passed by Congress.47
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has weighed in on
state-issued laws aimed at bad faith communication between a patent holder and a
potential infringer.48 In Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc.,49 the
court held that federal patent law preempts any state statute that imposes “tort
liability for a patent holder’s good faith conduct in communications asserting
infringement of its patent and warning about potential litigation.”50 A party can assert
a state-law tort claim against an alleged patent infringer, “only to the extent that those
claims are based on a showing of bad faith action in asserting infringement.” 51 In order
to survive federal preemption, a claim based on bad faith “must be alleged, and
ultimately proven.”52

competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) (reporting that as technology has advanced, companies have
used software patents to harm one another in court); White House Report at 5 (reporting that in 2012,
NPEs filed 62 percent of all patent suits. This is up from 2010 when NPEs filed only 29 percent of all
patent suits. The report attributes this increase partly to an increase in technology, because there
“are an increasing number of computer and communications patents, whose wider breadth makes
them more easily abused.”).
45 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152 (recognizing that “the tension between the desire to freely exploit
the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to deploy those
resources is constant.”
46 Id. (explaining that on the one hand, society wants to “freely exploit the full potential of our
inventive resources,” while on the other hand, doing so would eliminate any “incentive to deploy those
resources.” The court held that states may not interfere where “it is clear how the [federal] patent
laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance.”).
47 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (stating that “No state court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for
relief arising under any act of Congress relating to patents . . .) (emphasis added).
48 Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the main appeal concerns the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California’s decision to recognize the validity of a state law that outlaws “tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage and unfair competition arising from an allegation of a patent
infringement).
49 Id. at 1377.
50 Id. In Globetrotter, a company called Rainbow was looking to purchase the outstanding shares
of the Elan Computer Group. Id. at 1369. Before the purchase, the CEO of Globetrotter Software
sent e-mails to the CEO of Rainbow, alleging that Elan's products infringed Globetrotter's patents.
Id. at 370. Elan’s CEO Ken Greer believed these e-mails gave Rainbow some kind of leverage and
ultimately led to Rainbow purchasing the outstanding shares at a “much lower price.” Id. Moreover,
Greer lost an opportunity to get a 2-year employment agreement with Rainbow. Id. Based on these
facts, Greer filed state tort claims against Globetrotter for “tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage and unfair competition.” Id.
51 Id. at 1374.
52 Id.
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In Globetrotter, the court relies on previous Supreme Court holdings to determine
that the First Amendment protects the right to obtain redress. 53 Other courts have
held that this right extends to pre-litigation communication.54
B. Vermont’s Consumer Protection Laws
Businesses in the State of Vermont made it known that NPE legal threats
jeopardized their ability to continue doing business. 55 To protect Vermont businesses
from NPE abuse of the patent system, Vermont’s lawmakers amended the state’s
already existing consumer protection laws. 56 The amendment outlaws “Bad faith
assertions of patent infringement” (“bad faith law”). 57 The bad faith law gives
Vermont’s attorney general and targeted individuals or companies the power to bring
a civil action against an NPE that sends an alleged bad faith letter seeking to extract
licensing fees.58
At the heart of Vermont’s bad faith amendment is the declaration that a party
“shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”59 The amendment
subsequently lists criteria under which a court may find that a patent infringement
letter was sent in bad faith.60 This list of criteria begins by requiring basic information,
53 Id. at 1375-76 (explaining that in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) the court held that the First Amendment prevented the Sherman
Act from extending antitrust liability to companies for “activities directed toward influencing
government action.” The court then cites Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972) (holding that the Noerr holding extends “attempts to petition the government for redress
through litigation in the courts.” The court then cites Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (holding that “an objectively reasonable effort to litigate
cannot be sham regardless of subjective intent.”). Finally, the Globetrotter court explains that “our
sister circuits, almost without exception, have applied the Noerr protections to pre-litigation
communications.” Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1376.
54 Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that the
right to seek redress through civil suit “must be given the same protection as the right to attempt to
induce a legislative or administrative body to take some lawful action.”). Id.
55 Bishop, supra note 1 (quoting the president of the Vermont Chamber of commerce as saying
legal fees and settlement related to NPE legal threats “can cripple small businesses.”) Chambers of
commerce are associations of businesses that promote their members’ interests. Along the same vein,
an organization called the Main Street Patent Coalition (hereinafter “Main Street”) has formed in
response to businesses being targeted by NPEs. Main Street is a “national, non-partisan coalition of
organizations dedicated to stopping patent abuse from trolls by encouraging Congress to pass
comprehensive, common sense patent reform legislation – now.”
MAIN STREET PATENTS,
http://mainstreetpatents.org/page.asp?id=19 (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
56 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195 (2013)(stating that the bad faith law was passed because, “Abusive
patent litigation, and especially the assertion of bad faith infringement claims, can harm Vermont
companies.”); Jeffrey C. Morgan, Do Patent Trolls Have A Future?, FED. LAW., (Oct.–Nov. 2013), at 46,
50 (explaining that Vermont made bad faith infringement letters illegal to fight “excessive patent
enforcement.”).
57 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2013).
58 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4199 (2013); Complaint, supra note 4 and accompanying text. The
complaint shows that when Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell sued MPHJ, he did so in
reliance on powers found in the old Vermont consumer protection Act, not drawing from the new bad
faith amendments.
59 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197.
60 Id.
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(1) The demand letter [must] contain the following information:
(A) the patent number;
(B) the name and address of the patent owner or owners and assignee or
assignees, if any; and
(C) factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target's
products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the
claims in the patent.61
The bad faith amendment then goes on to require an extensive list of actions or
non-actions that suggest the party sending a demand letter did so in bad faith. 62
To date, the new language of Vermont’s law has not been challenged in an
appellate court.63
After Vermont passed its law, other states enacted similar statutes. 64 The State
of Kentucky, for example, passed a bill that similarly to Vermont creates a cause of
action against parties that make or threaten a “bad-faith assertion of patent
infringement.”65

Id.
Id. Section (b)(2) requires the sender of the demand letter to have completed an analysis
determining whether the claims in the patent to the target's products; section (b)(3) requires the
sender of the demand letter to provide information requested by the letter’s recipient within a
reasonable amount of time. Through § (b)(4)–(8) the courts can consider the presence of bad faith
based on whether the sender of a demand letter demands “payment of a license fee or response within
an unreasonably short period of time,” an unreasonably expensive license is offered for the patent, the
claim is meritless and the letter sender knew so, the claim is deceptive or if the claim court already
found the claim meritless in a previous legal action. The broadest element of the law allowing courts
to find bad faith is in § (b)(9), which allows courts to look to “any other factor the court finds relevant.”
The law also gives several methods under which the court can find that a letter was sent in good faith.
63 A search of both Westlaw and Lexus Nexus produced no examples of a lawsuit citing Vermont’s
amended consumer protection law.
64 E.g., Bernard Nash, Massachusets Attorney General Martha Coakley Looks to Slay Patent
Trolls, INSIDE COUNSEL MAGAZINE (Jan. 28, 2014) (reporting that Coakley “has thrown the weight of
her office into dealing with [NPEs]” and quoting Coakley as saying that “[Vermont] consumer
protection laws prohibit false, misleading, deceptive, and unfair statements in commerce,” and that a
letter from an NPE that attempts to extort is against the law); Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont Could
Save the Nation From Patent Trolls, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013) (reporting that “Nebraska is
the second state whose officials have tried to shield local businesses from frivolous lawsuits by patent
holders.”).
65 KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE HOME PAGE, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/14rs/SB116.htm. (last
visited June 28, 2014).
61
62
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Vermont’s Bad Faith Law Conflicts with the Objectives of Congress
Federal patent laws do more than protect the intellectual property of the
inventor.66 They also ensure that every citizen in the nation has the opportunity to
purchase, enjoy and take advantage of new technology. 67 An inventor can assert patent
rights through the offices and guidelines established by the Federal Patent Act. 68 This
centralized patent regulation allows patent holders in one state to rely on predictable
and uniform legal procedures when seeking potential redress from a patent infringer
headquartered in another state.69 This is important because the idiosyncratic nuances
of a hypothetical, nation-wide system of differing state patent regulations might not
operate efficiently enough to encourage invention. 70 A decentralized patent system

66 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556 (1973). In this civil action the Supreme Court upheld
a state’s ban on record piracy. Id. In coming to its conclusion, the court explained the history for, and
public policy reasons why the framers of the Constitution gave Congress authority over patents. Id.
at 576. A centralized patent system “eliminates the need for multiple [patent] applications and the
expense and difficulty involved.” Id. at 556. The Court understood that a federal patent system has
the effect of promising patent holders “a reward greater in scope than any particular State may grant
to promote progress in those fields which Congress determines are worthy of national action.” Id. See
also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 43, (arguing that the property rights of patent holders should be
honored the same way Great Britain honored the property rights of copyright holders. Madison wrote,

The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right
of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to
the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of
the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
67 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68 35 U.S.C. § 101, see also S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 4–5 (1981) (explaining reasons for the Federal
Circuit’s creation, noting that the Courts Improvement Act was “part of a comprehensive program
designed to improve the quality of our federal court system and to enhance citizen access” to the justice
system).
69 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)(finding that the “offer
of federal protection from competitive exploitation of intellectual property would be rendered
meaningless in a world where substantially similar state law protections were readily available.”). Id.
70 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 20 (2014) (acknowledging
that “concerns about uniformity and patent expertise are regularly invoked to rationalize exclusive
federal jurisdiction and have come to dominate broader discussions of institutional policy in patent
law.”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1619, 1674-75 (2007) (mentioning that the original need for a uniform statutory scheme. The
authors write that early proponents of technological progress feared that “to allow each of the fifty
states to enact their own patent systems — would render the patent system essentially inoperable.”)
(hereinafter “Nard & Duffy”); B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and
Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790-1920, at 67 (2005) (writing that greater
uniformity of patent laws under one centralized federal system “facilitated the development of a
national market.”).
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would contain inconsistent regulations. 71 Additionally, decentralized patent systems
would likely offer less efficiency than the current, centralized patent system. 72 Thus,
in passing the Federal Patent Act, Congress not only wanted to promote the arts and
sciences, but also to limit the states’ ability to participate in the federal patent
scheme.73 Vermont’s introduction of a bad faith law to the federal patent system acts
as an obstacle to the objectives Congress set out to accomplish with the Federal Patent
Act.74
When the owner of a patent decides to take legal action against an alleged
infringer, the patent owner must notify the alleged infringer of the patent’s existence.75
This notice is important because a patent holder cannot recover damages for
infringement that occurred before the alleged infringer received notice of the
infringement.76 By requiring a patent holder to notify the target of a potential patent
infringement lawsuit, Congress extends federal control of pre-litigation patent
disputes beyond the reach of a courtroom.77 Since this extension of federal control

71 Nard & Duffy, supra note 70, at 1628 (noting that centralization and uniformity “are intimately
connected in the literature because uniformity is one of the primary arguments typically made in favor
of centralization. It was indeed one of the principal justifications for creating the Federal Circuit.”).
72 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:
Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1203, 1228-29 (1997) (concluding that “Decentralized governments will be most efficient for those
activities and regulations that can be efficiently provided to small populations and that have no
significant positive or negative spillovers onto nonresidents. For goods with significant economies of
scale in production (“public” goods) and other goods and regulations with positive economic spillovers,
a single centralized government is likely to improve efficiency.”).
73 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 453, (2010)
(commenting that rather than encouraging attempts at reform at the state level, “Congress has
willfully attempted to punish the local, bottom-up reformers.”) (hereinafter “Nguyen”). Nguyen also
writes that the first Congress passed the Patent Act of 1790 in “recognition of the importance of having
a national patent system.” Id. at 467.
74 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363 (2000) (emphasizing that in the absence of any field preemption, federal
law preempts state laws when the state law acts as an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." The Crosby court); Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1377
(holding that federal patent laws “preempt state laws that impose tort liability for a patent holder's
good faith conduct in communications asserting infringement of its patent and warning about
potential litigation.)”.
75 Dunlap, 152 U.S. at 246. In Dunlap, Benjamin Schofield, Jr. filed suit against J. Dunlap &
Sons, for infringement of a rug design. Id. at 243. Schofield won in the lower court, but Dunlap
petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that Schofield never notified Dunlap of the patent’s existence.
Id. Justice Horace Gray began his opinion by noting that patents must be marked in a way that lets
the public know the invention is patented. Id. at 246. If not, and a law suit for infringement is filed,
the defendant must be “duly notified of the infringement.” Id. at 247. Gray based his opinion on the
wording of federal statute “section 4900” which was the precursor of 35 U.S.C. § 287. Id. at 243.
76 Id. at 247; Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Holding that a patent
holder can recover damages if the patent holder or licensees “did not inform the alleged infringers of
infringement before expiration of the patent.”); 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(2) (requiring that recovery of
damages for a patent infringements will be denied if the infringement took place before the alleged
infringer had notice of the infringement).
77 Id.; see also Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1260 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (holding that federal control extends to pre-litigation communications and preempts statelaw tort liability “when a patentee in good faith communicates allegations of infringement of its
patent.”).
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occupies the field of patent law, it should preempt a state law like Vermont’s, which
outlaws “bad faith” demand letters. 78
So who gets to question whether an NPE has written a demand letter in bad
faith?79 Only the federal courts should be able to answer that question. 80 In its attempt
to protect businesses from patent infringement notices, however, the State of Vermont
outlawed “bad faith” letters.81 Therefore, Vermont’s bad faith law is an attempt to
determine that a patentee’s notice of infringement was illegal. 82 But the Federal
Circuit Court already has a method for determining whether a notice of infringement
is illegal or not.83
The Vermont bad faith law uses a mix of subjective and objective tests to
determine whether an NPE has delivered a bad faith notification of infringement.84
This test differs from the federal courts’ interpretation of bad faith and thus the two
laws clash.85
78 Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 1390, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that with
“With respect to field pre-emption, Title 35 occupies the field of patent law.”).
79 Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Buckeye
Steel shows that federal courts have defined the legally appropriate substance of a notice letter. In
Buckeye Steel, patent holder Amsted Industries Inc. owned a patent related to a center plate for
railway cars. Buckeye Steel Castings tried to license the design, but was denied. Id. at 180. So
Buckeye steel copied the patent’s design. Id. A lawsuit ensued. Id. Amsted won the suit in the lower
court. Id. at 181. Among the issues in Buckeye’s appeal was the issue of proper notice under section
287. Id. In the lower court, the jury found that a letter written by Amsted to Buckeye did qualify as
legal notice of a patent infringement. Id. Similarly to the letter MPHJ sent, the Amsted letter was
sent to multiple companies “and did not explicitly charge Buckeye with infringement of Amsted’s
patent.” Id. at 186. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the letter in question did
not constitute notice, saying that “[a]ctual notice requires the affirmative communication of a specific
charge of infringement by a specific accused product or device.” Id. at 187.
80 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162 (holding that “state regulation of intellectual property must yield
to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws.”). Id. at 162.
Generally speaking, the states have the authority to “adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the
United States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). But in Bonito Boats, the court saw a need
to prevent states from second-guessing federal patent laws that work to incentivize invention. 489
U.S. at 152. A question can also be raised as to whether or not Vermont has jurisdiction to regulate
patent infringement notice letters. But for the argument presented in Part III.A., this comment does
not delve into the question of Vermont’s jurisdiction over patent disputes. It should be noted, however,
that in April, 2014, a federal court handling the case between MPHJ and the State of Vermont held
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and sent the case back to state court. Vermont v. MPHJ
Tech. Investments, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-170, 2014 WL 1494009, at *4 (D. Vt. Apr. 15, 2014). The federal
court held that none of Vermont’s claims questioned the validity of MPHJ’s patents. Id.
81 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2013).
82 Id. (allowing a court consider several factors “as evidence that a person has made a bad faith
assertion of patent infringement.”).
83 Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Mikohn Gaming Corp.
v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (holding that a “threshold showing of
incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the
communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights.” The court also held
that bad faith infringement letters have been enjoined and as an example uses the situation in which
a patent holder “makes threats without intending to file suit.”) (quoting Betmar Hats, Inc. v. Young
America Hats, Inc., 116 F.2d 956, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
84 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2013); supra note 62 and accompanying text.
85 Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (requiring the sender of a patent infringement
notification to provide information requested by the letter’s recipient within a reasonable amount of
time, and allowing the courts to find bad faith when the sender of the notification asks for “payment
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Moreover, federal law already outlines the process for notification of a patent
infringement.86 This federal process requires that, “[t]he patent holder shall include
in the notification such information as is reasonably necessary to explain fairly the
patent holder's belief. . . [that an infringement occurred].”87 By using the phrase
“reasonably necessary,” Congress showed it intended for the Federal courts to use
objective and subjective analysis in order to determine the appropriateness of a notice
of infringement.88 Vermont’s bad faith law introduces a new, enumerated list of
criteria under which courts may find bad faith. 89 By giving courts new criteria with
which to find bad faith, the Vermont bad faith law conflicts with existing federal,
“stringent requirements for patent protection.”90
In Globetrottter Software the Federal District Court addressed state attempts to
regulate patent controversies via tort laws.91 The court did not place an outright ban
on such laws, but it did allow room for regulation of bad faith “conduct in
communications asserting infringement of [the NPE’s] patent and warning about
potential litigation.”92 Imagine an America, though, where every state has its own tort
laws defining a bad faith patent assertion notice, just like Vermont. While some states
would likely adopt very similar laws, it is also possible that some states would adopt
laws with a different standard for bad faith.93 It follows that states’ different standards
and subsequent interpretations of the law would create complex legal situations for
plaintiffs.94 The complexity arises not because of the requirements of Vermont’s bad
faith law specifically, but in the presence of many bad faith laws due to a need for
of a license fee or response within an unreasonably short period of time,” or offers an unreasonably
expensive license for the patent, with, Mikohn Gaming Corp., 165 F.3d at 897 (allowing courts to find
bad faith upon a broader “threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either,” when
notification is sent); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152 (holding that states clash with federal patent law
if state laws enters an area where federal laws strike a balance between the need to protect patent
rights and the desire to “freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources.”
86 35 U.S.C. § 287.
87 35 U.S.C. § 287.
88 Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that a showing of bad faith as required for liability in notification of an alleged patent
infringement “includes separate objective and subjective components.”).
89 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
90 Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that
a state cause of action that frustrates Congress’s objective of promoting “stringent requirements for
patent protection,” is preempted).
91 Globetrotter Software Inc., 362 F.3d at 1377.
92 Id. at 1374.
93 Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 543, 556 (2003) (explaining that lawmakers created the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit partly to help homogenize the differing appellate decisions in patent cases).
Seamon writes that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was intended to settle legal conflicts.
Id. at 556.
94 George T. Conway III, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 Yale L.J.
1099, 1100 (1987) (arguing in favor of the consolidation of multi-state litigation in state courts and
attributing the differing procedural requirements of the varying states to complex litigation)
(hereinafter “Conway”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (explaining that the federal rules of civil procedure exist “to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”); see also
Christine Gail Clark, The Sky Is Falling-the Ali's Efficient Response to Courts in Crisis?, 1995 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 997, 1002 (1995)(arguing that even though complex litigation will not stop the court system
form functioning, “unfortunately, complex litigation can yield determinations that are slow,
enormously expensive, and potentially unjust.”). Id.
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duplicative discovery and trials on a state-by-state basis.95 In the hypothetical
situation described above, plaintiffs would have to file related causes of action in
different courts, wasting court resources and leading to inconsistent adjudication. 96
According to professor Margarita Trevino de Coale, as multistate litigation increases
in complexity it has also increased in cost.97
B. The Federal Government’s Dominant Interest in Patent Regulation Preempts States’
Bad Faith Laws
Federal control extends so broadly over the field of patent law, that it thus should
preempt Vermont’s bad faith law.98
Vermont’s bad faith law creates a cause of action allowing the State of Vermont
and targeted individuals or businesses to file suit against NPEs. 99 Additionally, the
law makes it much more difficult for patent holders to notify infringers of a potential
infringement.100 Though not expressly intentional, the Vermont bad faith law has the
95 Conway at 1100 (contending that if the same cause of action must take place repeatedly but in
different states, attorneys would have to engage in expensive, duplicative and inconvenient pre-trial
procedures).
96 Id. at 1104 (stating that no method exists for consolidating multi-state claims).
97 Margarita Trevino de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel
Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United States, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 79, 84 (1999) (writing that the
expense of inefficiencies resulting from litigating the same claim in multiple states has triggered calls
for legislative and judicial reform). Id. at 84.
98 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (holding that field preemption occurs when
federal law regulates conduct in a field that Congress “intended the Federal Government to occupy
exclusively.”). In English, the court had to determine whether federal laws preempt a state law cause
of action for a tort. Id. at 74. The petitioner was a woman named English, who, while working at a
nuclear power plant, had concerns about the safe practices of other employees. Id. English
intentionally left nuclear material exposed in order to prove to her superiors that conditions at the
plant were unsafe. Id. at 75. As a result, English was fired and escorted from the plant. Id. English
filed suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a state-based tort. Id. Her employer, General
Electric, argued that federal laws preempted the IIED suit, specifically, the Atomic Energy Act and
the Energy Reorganization Act bar recovery for “whistleblowers” who deliberately cause a violation.
Id. at 78. General Electric said these laws preempted English’s IIED claim because the federal
government has a better chance of promoting nuclear safety if it can deter deliberate acts of sabotage
by employees. English, 496 U.S. at 82. In fields of regulation where the federal interest is extremely
dominant, the federal system “will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.” Id.at 79; Cover, 83 F.3d 1390, 1393 (holding that with “With respect to field pre-emption,
Title 35 occupies the field of patent law.”); supra discussion in Part III.A.
99 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4199 (2013), see discussion supra Part II.B.
100 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2013). Hypothetically speaking, Vermont’s bad faith law creates
numerous burdens on a patent holder seeking justice. Suppose a patent holder was a citizen of Illinois
and numerous companies and businesses in Vermont, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut and
Florida were actively infringing upon this patent holder’s rights. The patent holder would have to
draft letters that were careful not to violate any of the 12 sources of evidence of bad faith. The bad
faith law’s section 4197(b)(1)(C) allows the court to find evidence of bad faith if a notification letter
does not have “factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target's products,
services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.” In order to
comply with this section, the patent holder would have to do extensive research on each of the
companies infringing its patents. Not only would this be time consuming and expensive. By their
very nature, patent issues deal with new technology. It is possible that identification of the “specific
area” in which an infringement occurs, could require the opinion of an expert. The Vermont bad faith
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effect of adding uncertainty to patent litigation.101 Uncertainty in the outcome of
patent litigation influences a patentee’s decision to patent in the first place. 102 This
influence is a form of de facto control, or regulation. 103 State regulation cannot exist
in the same field where the federal government has exclusive control over patent
regulation.104
The Constitution empowered Congress to create the patent system we have
today.105 Congress’s compelling interest to see its creation of the Patent system
succeed is pure tautology. This is evidenced by the fact that Congress wrote and passed
laws to make the patent system operate property.106 Moreover, Congress created the
Patent and Trademark office107 and gave federal courts the power to enforce those
laws.108 All of this shows the existence of a legal system Congress wanted the federal
law lets the court make this determination. Moreover, it might not be entirely possible for a patent
holder to be very specific about the areas in which an infringement occurs. At the pre-litigation stage,
companies do not necessarily have a duty to cooperate with the patent holder, let alone answer the
patent holder’s telephone calls. Vermont’s bad faith law also requires patent holders to offer to license
the patent in question for “an amount that is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the
license.” Id. at § 4197(b)(5). A patent license may have more value in some states, as opposed to
others (ie., inventions that help consumers during intense winters would have more value in Vermont,
than they would in a warmer state like Alabama or Florida). If a patent holder recognizes that a
patent infringement in one state is costing it more than a patent infringement in another state, the
patent holder may require different sums of money.
101 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4199. The bad faith law does not specifically state anywhere that it
was designed to regulate the patent process; Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent
Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737, 1769 (2011) (reasoning that explicit, “on-point legal rules
can still have open-texture legal categories at a high level of abstraction or discretion (e.g.,
“reasonable”).” This criteria gives rise to “considerable ex ante uncertainty.”) (hereinafter “Surden”).
102 Surden, supra note 101, at 1749 (proposing the concept that inventors would be discouraged
from investing in the kind of research needed to bring an invention to fruition if they do not have an
efficient, certain method of recouping to their investment due to underpricing by copying competitors).
103 Cf. De Facto, Black's Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009) (defining that term as “[a]ctual;
existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or legally recognized”); cf. Metro. Taxicab Bd.
of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a law can be
preempted if it “indirectly regulates within a preempted field in such a way that effectively mandates
a specific, preempted outcome.”); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156
(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a law that references or even makes the existence of “preempted subject
matter essential to the law's operation, then that state law is preempted by the federal law.” Id. In
Metro, the Second Circuit held that the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act preempted a city’s
law that minimized the rate taxicab owners could lease vehicles to drivers if vehicles did not have
hybrid or clean-diesel engines. Id. The Second Circuit held that the law was a de facto regulation
related to fuel economy standards in conflict with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and thus
preempted. Id.
104 See generally Part II.A. (explaining that Congress, empowered by the Constitution, has given
the federal government exclusive control over patent law).
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
106 35 U.S.C. (2000).
107 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
108 Howard T. Markey, HOWARD T. MARKEY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A COMPILATION of
HIS WRITINGS, OPINIONS, AND SPEECHES 1663 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1998). In a lecture given
at John Marshall Law School in 1990, Markey explained Congress’s desire to fix what appeared to be
numerous problems in the U.S. patent system. Id. The solution, Markey said, was the invention of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1665. Markey said, “In none of its efforts has the
[Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] sought to structure a “new” or “improved” system, for that
would be the role of Congress.” Id.
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government to run.109 It is within this system where Vermont’s bad faith law defies
the broader standards for notice allowed in 35 U.S.C. § 287.
Room may exist within the holding of Globetrotter for a claim brought under
Vermont’s bad faith law to not be preempted.110 The holding in Globetrotter requires
defenders of Vermont’s bad faith law to distinguish the state’s law from the state tort
law questioned in Globetrotter.111 The Globetrotter court requires evidence of bad faith
patent assertion before allowing a state law to survive federal preemption. 112 The
Vermont bad faith law, however, allows a cause of action merely when there is “a bad
faith assertion of patent infringement.”113 The court in Globetrotter held that federal
patent laws preempt state laws that create liability for a patent holder’s
“good faith conduct in communications asserting infringement of its patent and
warning about potential litigation.” 114 The court in Globetrotter warned that a claim
based on a state law creating liability would not survive unless the plaintiff ultimately
proves bad faith, 115 and that the plaintiff must base its claim on a substantial finding
of actual bad faith.116 Under Vermont’s bad faith law, however, a cause of action may
be brought merely on the presumption that an NPE has issued a notification of patent
infringement in bad faith.117
Vermont’s bad faith law includes a list of factors under which a court may find
evidence of bad faith. 118 In Globetrotter, the court elaborated on the “jurisprudential
background of the bad faith standard” 119 and mentions that the Federal Circuit Court
already defines bad faith.120 The Globetrotter court noted that in Golan v. Pingel
Enterprise, Inc., bad faith exists when the patent holder sends a cease and desist letter
knowing that “the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, yet represents to

109 Nguyen at 449 (reasoning that Patent law is federal law, “so the appropriate body to initiate
and facilitate patent-law reform is the federal government.”).
110 Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that to avoid preemption, “bad faith must be alleged and ultimately proven, even if bad faith
is not otherwise an element of the tort claim.”); James B. Kobak, Jr. The Federal Circuit As A
Competition Law Court, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 527, 530 (2001) (restating the line of
decision that say in terms of state tort actions, the Federal Circuit requires bad faith to be “pleaded
and proved to avoid conflict preemption with patent laws.”).
111 Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1370. In Globetrotter, the appellant claimed that an e-mail alleging
patent infringement caused “tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and unfair
competition,” under a state-law tort. Id. at 1377.
112 Id. (holding that an “objectively baseless test” should be applied where a party challenges
“statements made in cease-and-desist letters by a patentee asserting its patent rights.”).
113 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2013).
114 Globetrotter 362 F.3d at 1377.
115 Id. at 1374.
116 Id. at 1377 (explaining that the court’s decision to allow state-law tort liability “for only
objectively baseless allegations of infringement rests on both federal preemption and the First
Amendment.”).
117 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195 (explaining that the purpose of the bad faith law is to “protect
Vermont businesses from abusive and bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Section 4199 of
the statute allows a “target of conduct involving assertions of patent infringement, or a person
aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or by a violation of rules adopted under this chapter,” to bring
an action in Vermont’s state court). VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4199.
118 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119 Id. at 1375.
120 Id. at 1377 (citing Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

[14:268 2015]

Patently Preempted

285

the marketplace that a competitor is infringing the patent.” 121 By issuing an express
standard of bad faith, a law like Vermont’s bad faith law outlaws conduct protected by
the federal government.122 Such competition would make it difficult for a patent holder
like MPHJ to comply with the intent of Congress 123 and the laws of Vermont.124
Vermont’s bad faith law, although a consumer protection law, conflicts with federal
patent laws because it outlaws the federally protected act of sending a notification of
potential infringement.125 When an actual conflict between state law and federal law
can be identified, we are to assume that Congress did not want there to be a conflict. 126
The existence of such a conflict leads to conflict preemption, leaving any state law
conflicting with federal law “without effect.” 127
C. Vermont’s Bad Faith law is Unconstitutional
Even if federal law does not preempt Vermont’s bad faith law, it may be
unconstitutional on the grounds that it prevents an NPE from seeking government
assistance.128 That is, unless the NPE’s effort to petition the government was a
“sham.”129 This raises the question of what constitutes a “sham” attempt to petition
121 Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Zenith Electronics
Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (holding that the Federal Circuit Court has
at times “recognized that a patentee's statements regarding its patent rights are conditionally
privileged under the patent laws, so that such statements are not actionable unless made in bad
faith.”).
122 Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (overruled
on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.), 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that if “a plaintiff bases its tort action on conduct that is protected or governed by federal
patent law, then the plaintiff may not invoke the state law remedy, which must be preempted for
conflict with federal patent law.”).
123 Dunlap, 152 U.S. at 246, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
124 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197.
125 See supra note 122 and accompanying text; compare C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d
1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the right to assert a duly granted patent is protected by the
presumption that the assertion is made in good faith), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (mandating
that “A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”).
126 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 885 (2000). In Geier, the court held that the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempts a plaintiff’s state law cause of action. Id. In
Geier, the petitioner was driving a car built by the American Honda Motor Company when he crashed
into a tree. Id. at 865. At the time of the car’s manufacture, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act allowed automobile manufacturers to decide whether or not to install airbags. Id. Geier
sued Honda under District of Columbia tort law. Id. The court, in its holding, reasoned that “one can
assume that Congress or an agency ordinarily would not intend to permit a significant conflict.” Id.
at 885.
127 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(holding that “it has been settled that
state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect.”). Id.
128 E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) (holding
that “[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of
course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”). Id. In Noerr, truck operators
filed suit against several railroads, claiming that the railroads colluded to destroy public opinion of
the trucking industry. Id. at 129. The railroads had hired a public relations firm with the apparent
plan to persuade lawmakers to pass laws aimed at the trucking industry. Id.
129 Id. at 144. The right to petition the government — as recognized in Noerr — was later
extended to courts in Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, which held that “the right to
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the government.130 In Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., the court said an alleged sham lawsuit exists if it is “objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits; and
only if challenged litigation is “objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's
subjective motivation.”131 Most federal circuit courts have extended this test to
situations “outside of actual litigation.”132 Some courts have also extended this
standard to bar state-law liability.133
Vermont’s bad faith law toughens the “sham lawsuit test,” making it more
difficult for patent holders to petition the government and potentially denying them a
constitutional right.134 For instance, Vermont’s bad faith law says that bad faith can
be found if a “demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response within an
unreasonably short period of time.” 135 Suppose a patent holder sent notices of
infringement and sought payment of a licensing fee within four weeks. Under the
Vermont bad faith law, in order for the courts to determine whether or not four weeks
is reasonable or unreasonable, they must question the patent holder’s subjective
motivation for offering four weeks.136 Under the “sham lawsuit test” in Prof'l Real
Estate Investors, Inc., however, courts may not question the subjective intent of the
patent holder unless “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits.”137 This subjective analysis takes place whether or not the patent holder’s
letter notifying infringement was based on merit.138 In contrast, Vermont’s bad faith
law has the potential to stop a patent holder from accessing the courts. 139 But, as has
been demonstrated, a party has the constitutional right to access the courts under
Noerr/ Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. and its progeny.140
petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but
one aspect of the right of petition.”). California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 510, (1972).
In California Motor Transp. Co, a trucking company alleged that a competing trucking company
filed numerous state and federal proceedings against them in an effort to monopolize trade in
commerce and goods. Id. at 509.
130 Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
131 Id.
132 Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
133 Id.
134 California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
135 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2013). The Vermont bad faith law allows courts to find evidence
of bad faith based on other conditions that require subjective analysis. This includes finding bad faith
if the patent holder does not give the infringer requested information about the law suit in a
“reasonable period of time,” or if the demand letter requires payment of a license fee within an
“unreasonably short period of time,” if the patent holder “knew, or should have known, that the claim
or assertion is meritless.” Id., supra note 100 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
137 Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60.
138 Id.
139 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195 (stating in its statement of purpose that the bad faith law “seeks
to facilitate the efficient and prompt resolution of patent infringement claims,” meaning a patent
infringement claim could end at this point in the procedural process of patent infringement lawsuit.
140 See supra note 128 and accompanying text; Dan Fligsten, Big Doctrine the U.S. Supreme Court
May Ultimately Decide How Far Noerr-Pennington Applies Outside the Antitrust Context, L.A. LAW.,
(February 2014), at 25 (summarizing that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine gives immunity to those
who initiate a lawsuit or submit forms required for the approval of government action); Joseph B.
Maher, Survival of the Common Law Abuse of Process Tort in the Face of A Noerr-Pennington Defense,
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IV. PROPOSAL
Despite an intensely polarized Congress,141 in December 2013,142 the House of
Representatives passed the Innovation Act, 143 which would have required greater
specificity in patent infringement demand letters.144 The Act explains Congress’s
concern with the abuse of patent infringement demand letters. 145 The Act would
require, minimally, that demand letters contain “basic information about the patent
in question, what is being infringed, and how it is being infringed.” 146 According to the
Act, demand letters that do not contain this information would be considered
“fraudulent or deceptive” and potentially “abusive.” 147 The act also places pressure on
parties asserting potentially frivolous patent infringement lawsuits by allowing the
court to award “reasonable fees and other expenses” to the prevailing party.148
On May 21, 2014, the U.S. Senate removed the Innovation Act from its Senate
Judiciary Committee’s agenda.149 As a result, most commentators believe the bill is
not likely to pass.150 The New York Times and the technology news Website
ArsTechnica.com blame trial lawyer lobbyists and pharmaceutical companies for
killing the Innovation Act at the last minute. 151

65 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 629 (1998) (summarizing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as being a
constitutionally rooted legal interpretation that “must prevail over an inconsistent state law cause of
action” that would prevent a party from bring a lawsuit to court).
141 Josh Kraushaar, The Most Divided Congress Ever, At Least Until Next Year, NATIONAL
JOURNAL (Feb. 6, 2014) (http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-vote-ratings/the-most-dividedcongress-ever-at-least-until-next-year-20140206)(opining that in 2013 “no Senate Democrat was more
conservative than a Senate Republican—and no Senate Republican was more liberal than a Senate
Democrat.”).
142 Timothy B. Lee, Patent Reform Bill Passes the House 325 to 91, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 5,
2013)
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/05/the-house-votes-on-patentreform-today-heres-what-you-need-to-know/).
143 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309 113th Cong. (2013). (hereinafter “The Innovation Act”).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Edward Wyatt, Legislation to Protect Against ‘Patent Trolls’ Is Shelved, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(May 21, 2014) (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/business/legislation-to-protect-against-patenttrolls-is-shelved.html?_r=1).
150 Id. (referring to the Innovation Act as “all but dead.”); Klint Finley, U.S. Senate Drives a Stake
Through Heart of Patent Reform, WIRED (May 21, 2014)
(http://www.wired.com/2014/05/ripinnovation-act/) (reporting that business leaders outside of government do not expect the act to be
reintroduced); Erin Mershon and Tony Romm, Patent Reform Hits Dead End in Senate, POLITICO
(May 21, 2014) (http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/patent-reform-senate-106968.html) (reporting
that the Innovation Act bill has been put “on hold indefinitely.”).
151 Joe Mullin, How the Patent Trolls Won in Congress, ARS TECHNICA (May 23, 2014)
(http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/how-the-patent-trolls-won-in-congress/)
(quoting
unnamed sources close to the Innovation Act’s negotiations who say Senator Harry Reid was
influenced by Pharmaceutical companies and trial lawyers to kill the bill); Edward Wyatt, Legislation
to Protect Against ‘Patent Trolls’ is Shelved, NEW YORK TIMES (May 21, 2014)
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/business/legislation-to-protect-against-patent-trolls-isshelved.html?_r=1) (explaining that “heavy lobbying by pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies,
universities and trial lawyers prevented the bill from advancing.”).
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A. Congress Should Allow Victorious Defendants to Recover Damages From Losing
Plaintiffs
In American jurisprudence, in most cases, plaintiffs who lose a civil suit do not
have to pay the attorney’s fees of the triumphant defendant. 152 There are exceptions
to that rule, like the exception for a frivolous lawsuit filed in bad faith. 153
Patent law allows the winner of a patent dispute to receive attorney fees as an
award, but limits these awards to “exceptional cases.” 154 The now stalled Innovation
Act would have allowed broader attorney fee shifting. 155 The act would have required
courts to award “reasonable fees and other expenses.” 156
By dropping the Innovation Act and its broad allowance of “reasonable fees,”
Congress lost out on an opportunity to discourage frivolous patent infringement
letters.157 Now, Congress should refocus its efforts on a fee shifting, “loser pays”
provision.158 Doing so would help reduce the problem caused by frivolous or vague
demand letters.159

152 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to
Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993) (hereinafter “Vargo”); see also Arcambel v. Wisemen 3
U.S. 306 (1796) (holding that a plaintiff cannot receive damages and attorney’s fees because “The
general practice of the United States is in opposition to” awarding of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who
also win damages). Id.
153 F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. U.S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). In F.D.
Rich the court held that the “American rule” is not an “absolute bar to shifting of attorneys' fees.” Id.
See also Vargo at 1578 (listing contracts as another example of an exception to the American Rule).
154 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
155 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309 113th Cong. (2013) (hereinafter the “Innovation Act”).
156 Id. Compare the Innovation Act (requiring courts to award prevailing parties with “reasonable
fees and other expenses,” with 35 U.S.C. § 285 (giving the court discretion over whether or not to
award only “reasonable attorney fees” to the prevailing party).
157 The Innovation Act. The “Fees and other expenses” section of the Innovation Act is crafted to
avoid concerns that less resourceful patent holders may be discouraged from filing suit, given the
potential for severe economic hardship. The statute says,

The court shall award, to a prevailing party, reasonable fees and other expenses
incurred by that party in connection with a civil action in which any party asserts
a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, unless the
court finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were
reasonably justified in law and fact or that special circumstances (such as severe
economic hardship to a named inventor) make an award unjust ...
If a
nonprevailing party is unable to pay an award that is made against it under
subsection (a), the court may make a party that has been joined under section
299(d) with respect to such party liable for the unsatisfied portion of the award.
The Innovation Act.
158 See generally, Francis J. Carney, "Loser Pays"--Justice for the Poorest and the Richest, Others
Need Not Apply, UTAH B.J., May 1995, at 18 (arguing that, a system where the losing plaintiff in
certain tort suits pays a defendant’s attorney fees, is unjust). This comment borrows the term “loser
pays” from Carney’s comment.
159 Cf. Christopher Hu, Some Observations on the Patent Troll Litigation Problem, 26 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 12 (2014) (suggesting that a more realistic method of recovering attorney fees
and costs would encourage defendants to fight frivolous patent suits).
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B. A “Loser Pays” Rule Would Discourage Bad Faith Demand Letters
A party must send a letter notifying a party of potential patent infringement as
one of the first steps in patent litigation.160 Imagine if a broader “loser pays,” feeshifting rule became law, as this comment supports. Suppose an NPE like MPHJ
Technology Investments wanted to sue businesses and individuals for using scanners
and e-mail in a way that violated MPHJ’s patents. Before sending out the hundreds
of demand letters to these alleged patent infringers, MPHJ would have to consider the
possibility of paying the legal fees of every one of those potential defendants, if those
defendants win. Ideally, this would force MPHJ to send demand letters only to
infringers against whom they have substantiated claims. Wanting to avoid the cost of
paying for many defendants’ legal fees, MPHJ would be forced to focus on a few strong
cases to test. This would have two benefits. In one way, many businesses would be
spared the headache of a patent infringement demand letter.
The second advantage would be toward businesses that have not sued. These
businesses would have time to analyze the outcome of MPHJ’s lawsuit against that
core group of alleged infringers.161 These Non-defendant businesses could decide
whether to pay a licensing fee or fight a potential lawsuit, based on the outcome of the
litigation between MPHJ and the more substantial infringers. In effect, the number
of frivolous notifications of infringement would likely decrease.162 Additionally, the
quality and precision of the demand letters would increase in order to avoid netting
defendants with strong chances of prevailing in trial. With fewer broad or vague
demand letters, bad faith challenges would also likely decrease. This is because
hypothetically, the NPEs would be incentivized to send demand letters only in good
faith.163

160 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). See also discussion supra Part II.A. (noting that when a patent holder
files suit against an alleged infringer, federal laws regulating notification of potential infringement
must be followed).
161 But cf. Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the America Invents Act: A
Call for Legislative Restraint, 2012 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 3 (2012) (mentioning that the America
Invents Act creates a new trial proceeding at the United States Patent and Trademark Office called
“post-grant review.”). Congress intended for the review to be a more affordable alternative to validity
challenges. Id. Stoll writes that the post grant review is based on the “same invalidity grounds that
an accused infringer can assert as a defense in litigation.” Id.
162 Cr. Vargo at 1585 (writing that courts award attorney fees to wining defendants to discourage
plaintiffs from asserting non-meritorious claims, and that this is done as an effective way to
discourage abuse of the judicial system).
163 The Innovation Act (stating that Congress believes sending out “purposely evasive demand
letters to end users alleging patent infringement” abuses the patent system and requiring that a party
filling a patent claim include more detailed information about the specific claim, like e.g. the
identification of each patent related to the claim, identification of each accused process, machine,
manufacture involved in the claim and a “clear and concise description of the principal business, if
any, of the party alleging infringement.” The Innovation Act also would have then amended section
285 of Title 35 to allow the court to award “to a prevailing party, reasonable fees and other expenses
incurred by that party in connection with a civil action in which any party asserts a claim for relief
arising under” federal patent laws).
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C. Fee-Shifting Solves Problems With Unconstitutional State Laws
Passing a national law that mirrors Vermont’s bad faith law might potentially
avoid preemption. This proposal, however, would still violate an NPE’s right to seek
redress through the government.164 By implementing a “loser pays” rule, the states
and the federal government would have less need for laws that challenge the good or
bad faith of a demand letter.165 Not all small businesses will have the money needed
to defend a patent suit, merely hoping that the court will ultimately decide in their
favor and reimburse them. But if the threat of fee shifting became available, states
would have less of a need to regulate notice of infringement letters. 166 Thus, the states
would not violate the NPE’s constitutional right to file suit. 167
V. CONCLUSION
The State of Vermont reacted to the negative impact that frivolous or predatory
patent infringement lawsuits have on its businesses. 168 It is also clear that NPEs cost
private businesses significant, unwanted costs. 169
These non-practicing entities have gained mythic status for their seemingly
sinister tactics.170 Thus, many in the media media refer to NPEs as patent trolls. 171
164 See also Part III.C. (arguing that the right to seek redress in the courts is protected by the
First Amendment; supra note 129 and accompanying text.
165 See discussion in Part IV.A.2. (explaining that the presence of a “loser pays” rule would
discourage NPEs from sending multiple demand letters and thus minimize the need to scrutinize the
remaining demand letters.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
169 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
387, 389 (2014) (estimating that lawsuits or threats of lawsuits by NPEs have cost private companies
$29 billion). Bessen and Meurer argue that the costs of defending NPE lawsuits results in a social
loss. Id. Their survey of large and small companies that dealt with NPE lawsuits revealed that NPE
litigation is more expensive for smaller businesses. Id. at 388. Bessen and Meurer also found that
the median total litigation cost for small and medium-sized companies is $318,000 and $646,000 for
large companies. Id. at 404.
170 See James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function
of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (taking a defensive stance toward
the concept of the patent troll) (hereinafter “McDonough”); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or
Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114 (2010)
(pointing out how critics of NPEs have been accused of using weak and vague patents to file suit and
“engage in frivolous infringement litigation.”).
171 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, This is How the Patent Trolls and Trial Lawyers Won, TIME, (May 24,
2014) (http://time.com/111639/patent-reform/) (referring to NPEs as “so-called patent trolls”); Edwart
Wyatt, Legislation to Protect Against ‘Patent Trolls’ Is Shelved, NEW YORK TIMES (May 21, 2014)
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/business/legislation-to-protect-against-patent-trolls-isshelved.html?_r=0) (reporting that companies targeted by the Innovation Act are “widely known as
patent trolls); Ruth Simon and Angus Loten, States Revise Laws to Curb ‘Patent Trolls,’ WALL STREET
JOURNAL
(May
21,
2014)
(http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304422704579574293500331028) (reporting
that companies targeted by the Innovation Act are known as “so-called patent trolls”); Michael Hiltzik,
Patent Trolls Win a Huge Victory in Congress, LOS ANGELES TIMES, (May 30, 2014)
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Additionally, legal theories aimed at stopping a “troll’s” practices have become
favored.172 It should be obvious then, to see why few legal scholars seem willing to
take the side of these NPE’s and argue in favor of them.173 However, while NPEs do
not have a right to file an intentionally frivolous patent claim 174, it should be
remembered that they have the same property rights as other patent holders. 175
The federal government has had a difficult time curbing the negative effects of
NPE lawsuits for patent infringement.176 Naturally, states seek to fill this vacuum.
State governments, compelled by constituent political pressures 177 will follow
Vermont’s lead in combatting NPEs.178 These state-based, bad faith laws, however,
undermine the existing federal patent system and may block the constitutional rights
of an NPE.179 Congress can prevent this confusion and protect businesses by enacting
laws that allow fee shifting for bad faith demand letters. 180 Consequently, the states
would not need to invent their own methods of deterring frivolous patent litigation.

(http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-patent-trolls-20140530-column.html) (referring to
companies as patent trolls, but indicating the phrase as a label by merely using quotation marks).
172 See generally, McDonough (arguing throughout that “contrary to popular belief,” NPEs do
society well).
173 Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing
Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 131 (2010) (discussing its conclusion that the debate over NPEs
continues, “the general perception that has developed in the past few years is that on balance, [NPEs]
have been detrimental to innovation.”).
174 Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
175 M. Jones at 1041 (noting that non practice entities or “patent trolls,” despite their label, “may
either generate patents itself or acquire patents through transactions with inventors,” and that,
rather than practice a patented invention, an NPE still has the right to “enforce the patent right
through the negotiation of licenses against those who infringe on the patent.”).
176 John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 306 (2001) (writing that critics of the patent system have “urged
that patent attorneys are “stealing our future,” and generally declared the patent system to be in a
state of crisis.”); Michael Astorino, Obviously Troublesome: How High Should the Standard Be for
Obtaining A Patent, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 239, 247-48 (2007) (writing that existing low
patent standards empowered Patent Trolls to file patent litigation, forcing some patent holders have
to resort to “defensive patenting to avoid potentially expensive licensing fees.”).
177 As businesses or individuals continue to demand letters from NPEs, they will naturally look
to the government for help.
178 E.g., Jessica M. Karmasek, Patent Troll Law Goes into Effect in Georgia, LEGAL NEWSLINE
(July 24, 2014), (http://legalnewsline.com/news/250713-patent-troll-law-goes-into-effect-in-georgia)
(reporting that the Georgia law was based off of Vermont’s bad faith law); Scott Wartman, Kentucky
Lawmakers Look to Take Out Patent Trolls, CINCINATI.COM (March 10, 2014),
(http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/10/kentucky-lawmakers-look-take-patenttrolls/6278733/) (reporting that Kentucky was the third state to introduce laws similar to Vermont’s
bad faith law) Joe Mullin, Ten States Pass Anti-Patent-Troll Laws, With More to Come, ARS TECHNICA
(May 15, 2014), (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/fight-against-patent-trolls-flags-in-thesenate-but-states-push-ahead/) (reporting that 27 states have considered laws similar to Vermont’s
bad faith law and that as of May, 2014, 10 states had signed laws that are similar to Vermont’s bad
faith law).
179 See Part III (describing how Vermont’s bad faith law conflicts with existing Federal Law and
conflicts with cases that protect an NPE’s right to bring a law suit to court.
180 See Part III (proposing that fee shifting will discourage NPEs from issuing frivolous letters
alleging patent infringement).

